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Abstract Felsenstein’s method of independent contrasts
(FIC) is one of the most widely used approaches to the
study of correlated evolution. However, it is also quite
controversial: numerous researchers have called various
aspects of the method into question. Among these objec-
tions, there is one that, for two reasons, stands out from the
rest: first, it is rather philosophical in nature; and second, it
has received very little attention in the literature thus far.
This objection concerns Sober’s charge that the FIC is
methodologically flawed due to its (seemingly) resting on
the assumption that the traits it studies evolved by drift—
and thus ruling out selective hypotheses from the start. In
this article, I try to rebut this charge. To do this, I first
consider a preliminary conceptual worry—the question of
how it is even possible for two drift-driven traits to be
evolutionarily correlated—and show that it can be
answered by noting that the FIC can be seen as being
concerned with the investigation of the modularity of the
relevant traits. Given this, I then show that Sober’s meth-
odological charge can at least be mitigated by noting that
the assumptions behind the FIC do not in fact preclude it
from investigating selective hypotheses. I end by pointing
out that making this clearer is not just relevant for
defending the cogency of the FIC, but also for developing a
deeper understanding of correlated evolution in general.
Keywords Brownian motion  Idealization 
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One of the most prominent comparative methods—
appealed to in many contexts from botany to zoology and
human evolution—is Felsenstein’s method of independent
contrasts, or FIC (see Felsenstein 1985, 2004, Chap. 25;
Harvey and Pagel 1991, Chap. 5).1 Despite this promi-
nence, though, this method is also very controversial. In
particular, various researchers have questioned its general
plausibility and practicality, leading to vigorous responses
by defenders of the method and equally vigorous counter-
responses by the attackers (e.g., Harvey et al. 1995a, b;
Westoby et al. 1995a, b; Freckleton et al. 2002; Felsenstein
2002, 2004). As I try to make clearer in this article, though,
there is one—rather philosophical—worry surrounding the
method that, while sometimes pointed out, has not yet
received the attention it deserves: namely, that the FIC is
conceptually or methodologically flawed.
In particular, it is sometimes claimed that the FIC pre-
sumes that the traits it studies have evolved by drift—even
though determining the selective history of these traits is
precisely what the method is meant to be used for (for a
particularly explicit version of this charge, see Sober 2008,
pp. 252–253).2 Addressing this worry is the aim of this
article. As it turns out, doing this is not just interesting for a
defense of the cogency of the FIC, but also because it
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1 Recently, a different type of method, Phylogenetic Generalized
Least Squares (e.g., Bulmer 1991), has become popular as well;
however, it remains true that the FIC occupies a central position in
this area.
2 A somewhat related worry could also be raised for many methods
of phylogenetic inference. For example, maximum likelihood meth-
ods typically assume that the relevant characters evolved by drift
(e.g., Harvey and Pagel 1991; Felsenstein 2004), even though the
results of this analysis are often used to test the claim that these
characters have evolved by natural selection (e.g., through doing
comparative studies). However, to make the discussion more
tractable, I will restrict myself to discussing only the FIC here.
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brings out several issues of interest for our understanding
of biological evolution in general.
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, I
briefly present the aims and outlines of the FIC approach. I
then spell out Sober’s charge that the method is method-
ologically flawed, and lay out a related preliminary con-
ceptual worry. In the following two sections, I respond to
the conceptual worry and Sober’s methodological objec-
tion. Finally, I briefly consider some general insights that
come out of the discussion, and then conclude.
Felsenstein’s Method of Independent Contrasts
In order to most easily present the methodological worries
concerning the FIC, it is best to begin by briefly laying out
the background, abstract structure, and aims of the method.
To do this, start by assuming that we want to find out about
the evolution of two continuous traits, X and Y, across a set
of taxa. For example, assume that we have the suspicion
that these two traits have evolved by natural selection, and
that we want to investigate this suspicion in more detail.
More generally, assume that we are looking for evidence
concerning what the evolution of these two traits was
like—which factors determined this evolution, and how did
these factors determine it?
Now, importantly, finding out about a correlation in the
evolution of these two traits would seem to be tremen-
dously useful in this regard. Most directly and obviously,
such a correlation could be taken as evidence for the fact
that the two traits are adaptations: after all, it seems that a
simple and direct explanation for why the two traits are
evolutionarily correlated is that natural selection is driving
both in a similar manner.3 The FIC provides a means for
testing for the existence of this kind of correlation.
Note that in order to establish this existence, the key
problem that has to be solved is the fact that the trait values
in different taxa are not independent data points (due to the
fact that the different taxa all have a common ancestor;
Felsenstein 1985). The FIC tries to solve this problem by
noting that whatever may be true about the absolute values
of the traits, the differences between them must be statis-
tically independent. That is, leaving aside the starting
values of the two traits deeper in the phylogeny, if there is a
correlation in the evolution of the two traits, it must at least
be true that changes in X go with changes in Y (whatever
their actual values are). Made more precise, this insight is
sufficient to solve the problem of establishing correlation
among the values of the traits without falling prey to dis-
torting phylogenetic influences.
In more detail, the FIC approach can be set out in the
following three-step procedure (see also Felsenstein 1985,
p. 10):
1. Compute the values of the interior nodes by adjusting
the arithmetic average between the descendent nodes
for any differences in the respective branch lengths
(i.e., in the lengths of time and rates at which different
taxa have been evolving).4
2. Compute the contrasts of the two traits among the tip
species, and among the estimated interior nodes.
3. Test for a correlation among the contrasts.
However, it also needs to be noted that this method rests
on several key assumptions whose truth is necessary in
order to get it off the ground (see also Felsenstein 1985).
Among the most important of these assumptions are the
following three (see also Diaz-Uriarte and Garland 1996,
pp. 27–28):
(i) The phylogeny is known.
(ii) The branch lengths are known.
(iii) The evolution of the traits in question follows
Brownian motion (i.e., a random walk).
Assumption (i) is necessary as without knowledge of the
phylogeny, no independent contrasts could be computed: it
would then not be clear what these contrasts are.
Assumption (ii) is needed as ignoring differences in the
various branch lengths would introduce biases into the
values of the interior nodes. Assumption (iii) is needed as
for us to be able to even begin to compute the values of the
interior nodes, we need to have some idea about how the
trait values change over time—otherwise, it will not be
possible to infer their ancestral states. The assumption of
Brownian motion helps in this as it entails that for any
given starting value of trait X, it is just as likely that X
increases in value as that it decreases in value (and simi-
larly for Y); for this reason, the best estimate of the values
of X and Y of the ancestral nodes is the arithmetic average
of the values of X and Y of the descendent taxa. For what
follows below, it is this assumption in particular that is
important to keep in mind.5
3 As we will see momentarily, though, there might also be other
reasons for the existence of the correlation.
4 Note that the reason why we need to calculate the values of the
interior nodes is that what we are interested in (at least in most cases)
is establishing a correlation in the evolution of traits X and Y in
general—not just in that of X and Y in the tip taxa (see also Westoby
et al. 1995a, b; Felsenstein 1985, pp. 5–6). For details of the
calculations—which are not so important here—see, e.g., Felsenstein
(1985) and Harvey and Pagel (1991, Chap. 5). Note also that there is
scope for debate about how precise these calculations need to be; see,
e.g., Martins et al. (2002); this point will be addressed again below.
5 Technically, the contrast-based approach is not the only way of
interpreting the FIC. Mathematically, all the method does is calculate
covariances (and variances) of an evolutionary process, which is
made possible by the Brownian motion assumption. For present
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While much else could be said about the workings of the
method, for present purposes, the above is sufficient. What
is important here is just that this method has become a
staple in the investigation of (correlated) evolution—a vast
array of studies rest on it to an essential degree (e.g.,
Ackerly and Reich 1999; Harvey and Pagel 1991, Chap. 5;
Martins et al. 2002; Blomberg et al. 2003; Felsenstein
2004, Chap. 25). Despite this widespread use, however, the
method is also quite controversial; the next section con-
siders this controversy further.
Questioning the Cogency of the FIC
Ever since the FIC approach was first proposed a number
of objections to it have been raised. While many of these
objections have been heavily discussed (see for example
the exchange in Westoby et al. 1995a, b; Harvey et al.
1995a, b), there is a recent and rather philosophical charge
that has so far remained unanswered. In order to get a
better sense of the dialectical place of this charge, it is best
to begin by briefly sketching the other major criticisms that
have been made of the FIC.
First and most famously, there is the worry that the FIC
overcorrects for possible phylogenetic disturbing influ-
ences on the evolution of the traits in question (e.g.,
Westoby et al. 1995a, b; Desdevises et al. 2003). The
reason for this is that the FIC takes no account whatsoever
of the absolute values of the traits in question—only their
differences matter. This, though, may be seen to overshoot
its target considerably: some of the absolute values of the
traits in question will represent the effects of selection (i.e.,
of the organism’s ecology), and not of something like
‘‘phylogenetic inertia.’’ Relatedly, it also seems that the
FIC seems to focus too strongly on change, and ignores
stasis—it seems that the fact that some specific trait value
is being maintained in a population over time can be very
meaningful as well, and ought to be taken into account as
such (e.g., Westoby et al. 1995a, b; see also Sober 2008,
pp. 252–253).
However, it is now widely agreed that this objection
needs to be handled with care. Unless one denies that there
is any kind of inheritance of traits across generations—
which is clearly implausible—it somehow needs to be
acknowledged that different taxa will not be statistically
independent data points. It is for this reason that, by now,
everybody in the literature agrees that some correction for
phylogenetic influences needs to be made—what is really
at stake in this debate is how, exactly, this ought to be done
(see also Harvey et al. 1995a, b; Freckleton et al. 2002;
Housworth et al. 2004). While complex, it seems that this
is something that can be addressed by adding further
considerations to the basic version of the FIC, and does not
require a drastic shift away from the method (see also
Freckleton et al. 2002; Lynch 1991).6
The second set of objections to the FIC concerns the
truth of assumptions (i) and (ii)—in particular, there is the
worry that these assumptions are frequently false. Specifi-
cally, we often do not know the exact phylogeny of the taxa
in question, and even if we do know it, we often do not
know the relevant branch lengths with any degree of cer-
tainty. Given the fact that that this kind of knowledge is
necessary to get FIC off the ground, it might thus seem that
this method is not of much practical usefulness (see also
Felsenstein 1985, pp. 10–12; Harvey and Pagel 1991).
However, these sorts of worries also do not show that
there is a major flaw in the FIC.7 Primarily, this is because
we often have very good estimates of the appropriate
phylogenies and branch lengths, even though we do not
really have knowledge of them; in turn, this will—at least
in many cases—provide a sufficiently strong foundation to
build the FIC on (see also Lynch 1991, pp. 1078–1079;
Felsenstein 1985, 1988). This becomes particularly clear
by noting that, due to the recent increases in the available
amount of data (mainly because of better and cheaper gene
sequencing technologies), our understanding of the tree of
life—while remaining steeped in uncertainties—is, at least
in part, fairly well-grounded (e.g., Ackerly and Reich 1999;
Davis et al. 2007). In turn, this understanding will often be
enough to make meaningful applications of the FIC
possible.
The third—and for present purposes central—objection
to the FIC centers on assumption (iii). To understand this
objection better, it is best to begin by noting that this
assumption, at least on the face of it, strongly suggests that
the traits under investigation evolved purely by drift: if
changes in X and Y are no more likely to happen in one
direction rather than another, it seems that X and Y must
have evolved by drift only. However, this dialectical pre-
sumption in favor of drift seems very puzzling, as it
appears to sit badly with the aims of the FIC (see, e.g.,
Martins et al. 2002; Housworth et al. 2004). As Elliott
Sober puts it:
Footnote 5 continued
purposes, though, the formulation in the text is sufficient. I thank Joe
Felsenstein for useful discussion of this point.
6 Alternatively, one might say that trying to determine the absolute
values of the relevant traits or the possibility of evolutionary stasis
concerning them is answering a different question from the one that
motivates the FIC (and which needs different kinds of data to be
answered).
7 In fact, these worries speak to all kinds of comparative methods.
See also Sober (2000, Chap. 6).
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If we want to test the hypothesis that selection causes
lineages to evolve towards a stable optimum, the
Brownian motion assumption is not appropriate. The
assumptions used to test a selection hypothesis
against others should be independent of which of
these hypotheses is true; the assumptions should not
entail that the selection hypothesis is true, but neither
should they entail that it is false (Sober 2008,
pp. 252–253).
It seems clear that Sober’s objection here is at heart a
methodological claim. His worry seems to be that the FIC
begs the question against the key issues it is meant to
investigate. As noted earlier, it is the aim of the FIC to
provide us with evidence about the evolution of the traits
under study—about whether that evolution happened by
natural selection, drift, or in some other way, and about
how it did so. Given that, though, it seems highly
problematic that the method presumes, from the start, that
the evolution of the traits it studies happened by drift:
this seems to build a particular answer to the key ques-
tion the FIC is designed to investigate right into the
method itself. In short: there is something methodologi-
cally troubling about the FIC—issues that should be left
open (as they are the target of the investigation) are in
fact closed off by the method. In what follows, I shall
call this the methodological charge of the FIC.
However, before discussing the methodological charge
in more detail, it is useful to consider a related pre-
liminary worry first. This worry is based on the idea that,
if Sober is right that the Brownian motion assumption at
the heart of the FIC is equivalent to an evolutionary
model of drift, then the method seems to become con-
ceptually incoherent. If it is assumed that two biological
traits evolved by pure drift, then it might seem that it is
not biologically plausible that they are also correlated in
their evolution. Put differently: since assuming that two
traits evolved by drift is assuming that they evolved
randomly, the possibility that they evolved together
would seem to be ruled out from the beginning. After all,
if there is no systematic driving force like natural
selection behind the evolution of these traits, there might
seem to be nothing that could ground a meaningful
correlation in their evolution. For this reason, the FIC
could be regarded as conceptually flawed: it is not clear
how its results are even to be understood. In what fol-
lows, I shall call this the conceptual charge of the FIC.
As I will make clearer momentarily, while the concep-
tual charge raises somewhat different questions than
Sober’s methodological worry, it also brings to the fore
several important issues that are usefully noted in this
context. Begin, therefore, by considering the conceptual
charge in more detail.
The Conceptual Charge: Drift, Correlated Evolution,
and Trait Modularity
The conceptual charge of the FIC rests on the idea that it is
incoherent to suppose that there could be a biologically
meaningful correlation in the evolution of two traits, each of
which evolves by drift. Note that the restriction to biologi-
cally meaningful correlation is important, as no one doubts
that there could be spurious correlations in any two quanti-
ties—including two traits that evolve by drift. This, though,
would not seem to be something that is worth investigating
for its own sake. Put differently, the conceptual charge is the
claim that, given the assumption of drift underlying the FIC,
every time the method finds a correlation in the evolution of
two traits we should conclude that this is purely spurious, and
of no genuine biological importance. However, as I try to
show in what follows, this is false. In fact, there is a class of
biologically important scenarios that do feature a correlation
in the drift-driven evolution of two traits. This class of sce-
narios is constituted by cases in which two traits are causally
linked in such a way that, in an individual organism, changes
in one trait bring about changes in the other trait, i.e., that the
two traits have a low degree of modularity with respect to
each other (see also Felsenstein 1988). The following
example makes this clearer.8
Assume that the size of an imaginary plant’s leaves is
adaptively neutral when it comes to all environmental factors
(at least within certain limits); assume also that the same holds
for the size of its fruit. More specifically, assume that, in the
particular environment in question, larger leaves are no better
at converting carbon dioxide into energy than smaller ones,
that the plant’s pollinators show no preference for larger over
smaller fruits, that it is not significantly more costly to make
larger fruits and leaves than smaller ones (maybe because
there are abundant resources available), and so on for all other
environmental factors. In turn, this suggests that the two traits’
‘‘environmental’’ fitness function (i.e., the function that con-
siders all and only the environmental factors impacting the
fitness of leaf and fruit size) looks as shown in Fig. 1.
Importantly, assume further that there is a direct con-
nection between leaf size and fruit size in individual organ-
isms, so that increases in leaf size—however they were
brought about—automatically lead to increases in fruit size
in these organisms. There are many reasons for the existence
of such a connection. In the first place, it might be that there
are genetic linkages between both traits—for example, the
two traits might be pleiotropic effects of the same gene
8 Instead of talking of modularity, some writers prefer to speak of the
existence of genetic constraints or additive genetic covariances (e.g.,
Felsenstein 1988, 2002, 2004, Chap. 25). I favor the terminology of
‘‘modularity,’’ as it makes clearer that the source of the connection
between the traits in question need not be genetic, but can lie
elsewhere as well.
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complex (see also Felsenstein 1988). Second, it might be that
the developmental programs responsible for building fruit
and leaves are not entirely separate: for example, the two
traits might happen to depend on similar biochemical pro-
cesses going on at the appropriate times. Given this, if there is
a change in these processes (for whatever reason), both traits
can be expected to be affected simultaneously (see also
Wagner and Altenberg 1996). Finally, there might be phys-
ical constraints on the evolution of the two traits—as in the
case of body size and mass—so that the two simply could not
vary independently from one another.9
What is important to note about cases like this is that they
exemplify scenarios in which two traits are not very modular
(or ‘‘quasi-independent’’) with respect to each other (Le-
wontin 1978; Brosnan 2009; see also Striedter 2005; Machery
2007). While the notion of trait modularity is still somewhat
ill-defined, it is sufficient for present purposes to note that the
modularity of a trait can, at least to a first approximation, be
seen to consist in the extent to which that trait can vary
independently from other traits, at least in the medium term
(e.g., Simon 1962; Lewontin 1978; Carruthers 2006; Schulz
2008; Brosnan 2009; Godfrey-Smith 2009, pp. 57–59). Three
points are important to note concerning this notion.
First, the proximate cause of the modularity of a trait
concerns the extent to which the trait is linked to other traits
in an individual organism. Second, however, ‘‘trait modu-
larity’’ itself is an ultimate notion: traits that are highly
modular can evolve (largely) independently from one
another, whereas traits that are not cannot. Hence, the
investigation of the modularity of various traits is straight-
forwardly part of evolutionary biology. Thirdly and finally,
the modularity of a trait is a matter of degree: it is uncon-
troversial that no trait can vary completely independently
from all the other traits of an organism, and it is also
uncontroversial that it is not the case that an organism can
only be a changed as a whole. What is at stake is to what
extent any given trait can vary independently from other
traits (see, e.g., Lewontin 1978; Wagner and Altenberg 1996;
Schulz 2008; Brosnan 2009; Godfrey-Smith 2009).
From the perspective of the present discussion, the major
point to note concerning all of this is that the FIC gives us the
means for investigating the modularity of specific traits of
specific types of organisms (see also Felsenstein 2002).10 In
particular, the method can help us determine exactly how
modular various traits are in relation to each other. This is so,
as for two selectively neutral traits, the greater the correlation
in the independent contrasts, the less modular they are likely to
be.11 Put differently: the higher the correlation in the inde-
pendent contrasts of two selectively neutral traits, the stronger
the evidence that these two traits have a low degree of mod-
ularity with respect to each other. The reason for this is that a
low degree of modularity is the only non-spurious candidate
for the existence of evolutionary linkages between these two
traits: given that the traits are assumed to have evolved by drift
and to be evolutionarily linked, it becomes likely that they are
genetically, developmentally, or physically connected—for
these are the major causes for the existence of the evolutionary
connection here.12 Moreover, the degree to which they are
evolutionarily correlated gives insight into the strength of the
causal mechanisms connecting the two traits.
Hence, it becomes clear that, even if it is accepted (for
the sake of the argument) that the FIC assumes that the
traits in question evolved by drift—as the above objection
claimed—a correlation in their independent contrasts, far
from being conceptually suspect, turns out to be very easily
understandable. Importantly, moreover, investigating the
degree of modularity among various traits is theoretically
and practically highly useful: for example, this kind of
investigation can have important implications for the
Environmental Fitness 
Leaf / Fruit Size 
Fig. 1 Environmental fitness function for leaf and fruit size
9 This does not appear as plausible when it comes to the present
example, though.
10 Of course, it might be claimed that investigating the degree of
modularity is not normally what the FIC is in fact used for. However,
this is not a problem for the present defense of the method: on the one
hand, as made clearer below, the FIC can also be seen to have other
aims, and on the other, the present point is merely that the FIC can be
given a coherent aim even if it is assumed to be based on drift. See
also Felsenstein (1988, 2004, Chap. 25).
11 Note that, as such, trait modularity need not be a symmetric
relation: it may be possible that one trait can vary quasi-independently
of another, but not vice versa. If so, then the direction (including bi-
directionality) of the modularity needs to be established separately,
after a correlation in independent contrast has been found for
correlations are symmetric (see also note 24 below).
12 Note that this argument depends essentially on the assumption that
the two traits evolved by drift. If this assumption is dropped (as is
done below), the issues get more complex.
42 A. W. Schulz
123
efficacy of gene therapies and—though this is somewhat
controversial—the ‘evolutionary potential’ of the relevant
organism (see e.g., Hansen et al. 2003; Wagner and Al-
tenberg 1996).
In sum: the fact that the FIC assumes that the evolution
of the traits it investigates followed a Brownian motion-
like process does not mean that it is conceptually flawed.
There is nothing problematic about investigating correla-
tions in selectively neutral traits, as this can tell us some-
thing about the degree of modularity of these traits. Hence,
the conceptual charge of the FIC can be successfully
answered. Consider, then, Sober’s methodological charge
of the method.
The Methodological Charge: Brownian Motion
and Selection
The methodological charge of the FIC claims that the
method closes questions for discussion that should remain
open. In particular, the accusation here is that, by assuming
that the traits in question evolved by Brownian motion, the
method presumes they have evolved by drift. This, though,
should be left open (even if it is conceptually coherent), as
finding out about the factors that determine the evolution of
the traits is part of the motivation of using the method in
the first place. Now, the most straightforward way to
answer this charge is to show that the FIC can investigate
selective hypotheses, despite being based on an assumption
of Brownian motion.13
To show that this is in fact so, I consider three different
reasons for why the Brownian motion assumption behind
the FIC should not be seen to rule out the fact that the traits
it investigates evolved by natural selection. First, I shall
argue that Brownian motion can be used as a mathematical
simplification that has no implications concerning the
evolutionary processes at work. Second, I shall show that
Brownian motion can be used to describe ordinary direc-
tional selection. Third, I shall show that Brownian motion
can be used to describe a process that might be called
‘‘internal selection.’’ Note that these three reasons are not
mutually exclusive—they can all be true in different
cases.14 Note also that, as will become clearer below, while
not completely dispelling the methodological charge of the
FIC, together these three responses go quite a ways towards
making it significantly less threatening.
Brownian Motion as a Harmless Idealization
The first reason for denying the cogency of the methodo-
logical charge argues that the assumption of Brownian
motion at the base of the FIC should, at least at times, only
be seen to function as a harmless idealization. Specifically,
this assumption is often to not to be taken to describe the
actual evolutionary processes that are driving the traits in
question; instead, it is to be seen merely as a device for
simplifying the relevant calculations—and that in a way
that does not significantly bias their conclusions. In this
respect, the assumption does not differ from many other
idealizing assumptions used in evolutionary biology: for
example, many cognitive ethological models assume
unlimited memory stores, and many evolutionary game
theoretic models assume infinite population sizes and
completely random mating. In each of these cases, these
assumptions are merely employed as helpful fictions that,
while descriptively false, do not negatively bias the results
of the models they are embedded in.
The same can be true in the case of the FIC and the
assumption of Brownian motion (see, e.g., Diaz-Uriarte
and Garland 1996; Martins et al. 2002; Housworth et al.
2004). Specifically, at least at times, there is no need to
read any deeper descriptive intentions into the Brownian
motion assumption of the FIC. The relevant traits are not
really assumed to have evolved by drift—instead, the
random walk assumption is employed merely to aid the
relevant computations. As long as the evolutionary trajec-
tory of these traits is not very strongly biased in one
direction or another, there is no real harm in making this
assumption—and it has the benefit of making the necessary
calculations possible, or at least much easier (e.g., Martins
et al. 2002).
It needs to be noted that there is a flip side to this
argument: if there is strong directional selection for (one
of) the traits under study, assuming they evolved by
Brownian motion will lead the FIC to give biased results
when estimating their degree of evolutionary correlation
(e.g., Diaz-Uriarte and Garland 1996; Martins et al. 2002;
Housworth et al. 2004).15 Hence, this way of defending the
conceptual cogency of the FIC will not always work—it is
limited in its domain of applicability. However, this lack of
full generality should not be seen to detract from the
13 Note that the dialectic here is a bit complex. On the most
straightforward reading of Sober’s worry, he merely requires logical
independence between the assumptions of a method and the
hypotheses under study. This, though, is consistent with the assump-
tions and hypotheses being probabilistically highly non-independent
(e.g., there might be exactly one very far-fetched scenario of selection
that is consistent with the Brownian motion assumption, with all the
other scenarios featuring drift only). As I try to make clearer below,
though, I think that the solution defended here can apply to both
readings of independence.
14 Moreover, these three scenarios can be combined with the scenario
of traits that have a low degree of modularity with respect to each
other. See, e.g., Felsenstein (2002) for a model of this kind of case.
15 In fact, the importance of these sorts of scenarios might be a key
part of the motivation behind Westoby et al.’s worries concerning the
FIC (e.g., Westoby et al. 1995a, b).
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cogency of the defense of the FIC for a restricted class of
cases. As long as it is kept in mind that the Brownian
motion assumption is only sometimes cogent as an
approximation of directional selection, it seems to be per-
fectly acceptable for it to form the basis of the FIC: the fact
that the assumption is not always appropriate should not be
conflated with the fact that it never is.16
Brownian Motion as a Model of Directional Selection
The second reason for denying the methodological charge
of the FIC is based on the idea that it is generally false to
assimilate the fact that the evolution of a trait follows a
random walk with the fact that there is not (significant)
directional selection (see also Felsenstein 1988).17 In par-
ticular, the idea here is that the Brownian motion
assumption can, at times, also be seen to model a selective
process with a constantly and randomly shifting opti-
mum.18 This idea is familiar from population genetics:
there, it has frequently been noted that, in order to make
sense of the empirical data, it is often more plausible to
assume there was strong selection for a constantly chang-
ing optimum, rather than weak selection for a fixed opti-
mum (see, e.g., Gillespie 1998, p. 120). The only point that
is different here is that this changing optimum is not
moving uniformly in one direction, but is changing direc-
tion randomly (see also Felsenstein 1973, 1988, 2002,
2004).19 An example might make this clearer.
Assume that a certain imaginary angiosperm species is
subject to strong selection for having ‘‘deep’’ (saturated)
coloration in its petals if there are few pollinators around,
but light coloration if there are many pollinators around
(this might be due to the fact that achieving a ‘‘deep’’
coloration is energetically costly). Further, assume that the
selection pressure is strong enough that the species will be
at (or near) the optimal level coloration most of the time.
Finally, assume that the number of pollinators changes
randomly over time (e.g., due to the fact that this number is
sensitive to various randomly fluctuating ecological fac-
tors—like ambient temperature during the hatching sea-
son). Given all of this, the evolution of petal coloration in
the angiosperm species in question might end up following
a random walk. Importantly, though, this is despite—and in
fact because of—there being strong directional selection
for petal coloration.
In short: the second reason for doubting the cogency of
the methodological charge of the FIC has it that what looks
like evolution due to pure drift might in fact be evolution
by (strong!) natural selection for a randomly changing
optimal value. Of course, just as before, this defense of the
methodological cogency of the FIC will not always be
equally plausible: not all cases of natural selection feature
randomly changing optima. However, and also just as
before, this limitation of the defense should not be
overstated.
First, cases of randomly changing optima seem suffi-
ciently common to make the present defense of the FIC
interesting: as suggested by the above example, such cases
can come about for a variety of reasons, and should be seen
to be plausible hypotheses in many evolutionary investi-
gations. Second, the present response can be used in con-
junction with the previous one to make a strong case for the
methodological acceptability of the Brownian motion
assumption: if the goal is to capture weak unidirectional
selection, then the Brownian motion might be useful as a
harmless idealization20; if the goal is to capture strong
selection with a randomly changing optimum, then the
Brownian motion assumption might be useful as an accu-
rate description of reality. Third, just as before, it needs to
be kept in mind that just because a method is limited in its
applicability, this does not mean that it is methodologically
flawed: it is one thing not to be able to investigate all cases
of natural selection, but quite another not to be able to
investigate any (I will return to this point below). Consider,
then, the final reason for doubting the methodological
charge of the FIC.
Brownian Motion as a Model of Internal Selection
This third reason is based on the idea that, even if the
assumption of Brownian motion is seen to rule out that
traits X and Y are adaptations to some environmental factor,
it is still consistent with them being adaptations to each
other. In other words, the claim here is that the FIC can
often be seen to investigate selective hypotheses according
to which the source of the selection lies in the organism’s
internal constitution, not in its external environment.21 In
16 In fact, the same is true for all idealizations.
17 I thank David Baum for some useful remarks about this point.
18 It is also interesting to note that precisely this is sometimes
assumed in methods based on phylogenetic least squares (see also
note 1).
19 It seems that Sober (2008) wants to exclude this scenario from
consideration by his insistence that we investigate ‘‘stable optima’’
only. However, it is not clear why he would do this, given the
importance of moving optima.
20 We might also consider the possibility of ‘‘internal selection’’ in
this context—see below for more on this.
21 Note that ‘‘internal’’ here merely means that the trait in question is
an adaptation to features that are somehow part of the organism. It
does not mean that these features must be on the ‘‘inside’’ of the
organism (whatever exactly this may be taken to mean); in fact, in the
example to follow, both leaves and fruit are not internal in this latter
sense.
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order to make this idea clearer, let us return to the example
of the fruit and leaves mentioned earlier.
Just like before, assume that fruit and leaf sizes are
selectively neutral when it comes to all environmental
factors (so that the environmental fitness function of the
two traits is still as in Fig. 1). However, assume further that
certain combinations of fruit and leaf sizes are selectively
advantageous, in the sense that it will be adaptive for the
plant to have larger fruits given that it has larger leaves
(though it is not, as such, adaptive for it to either have large
leaves or larger fruits). One reason for this kind of
‘‘interaction effect’’ between fruit and leaf sizes may be
that the plant’s fruits are more easily noticed by its poll-
inators if they stand in a certain fixed ratio to its leaves,
viz., if they are neither too big nor too small (again keeping
in mind, though, that the size of the fruit by itself has no
impact on its being noticed by potential pollinators). For
this reason, if there is a random increase in leaf size, this
will make it adaptive for the plant to increase its fruit size
as well—and vice versa.22
Hence, fruit size here can be seen as an adaptation—just
not as an adaptation to an external factor, but as one to
another part of the plant: it is a selective response to
increases in leaf size (and not to changes in pollination
patterns in and of themselves). Graphically, this therefore
suggests that the organism’s iso-fitness curve, i.e., those
combinations of leaf and fruit size that leave the organ-
ism’s (overall) fitness unchanged, is as shown in Fig. 2.23
In the present context, what is most important about this
example is that it again makes clear that the FIC can
investigate interesting selective hypotheses, despite being
based on an assumption of Brownian motion. In particular,
the example shows that this assumption does not prevent
the FIC from investigating the situation where two or more
traits have the biological function to deal with each other:
in fact, the establishment of a correlation in independent
contrasts between these traits is some of the best evidence
for this kind of scenario available.24
Hence, there is again reason to doubt the cogency of the
methodological charge of the FIC: the method is perfectly
capable of investigating important selective scenarios. Of
course, just as above, it is important to note the caveat that
this use of the FIC is limited to certain kinds of selective
hypotheses—not every case of selection is of the ‘‘inter-
nal’’ variety. However, just as above, this should not be
seen as a major flaw of the method as such: virtually every
theoretical tool in biology (and in science in general) is
limited in applicability.
Tacking stock, what all of this means is that, contrary to
Sober’s objection, there are numerous cases of selection
that can be cogently investigated by the FIC. Specifically,
the assumption of Brownian motion can be used to
approximate many cases of weak to moderate unidirec-
tional ‘‘external’’ selection, it can describe all cases of
random-directional external selection, and it can describe
all cases of internal selection. Hence, there is no reason to
conclude that the method is completely methodologically
flawed due to its being based on an assumption of
Brownian motion.
However, it also needs to be acknowledged that there
are some selective scenarios—strong unidirectional exter-
nal selection for example—that are out of reach of the
method. For this reason, the present defense can only
mitigate Sober’s worry—it cannot fully resolve it. In this
Fruit Size 
Leaf Size 
Fitness = w* 
Fitness = w
Fitness = w
Fig. 2 The iso-fitness curve for different fruit and leaf sizes
22 Another good example for this sort of scenario might be
camouflaging coloration in various animals. In order for such a
coloration to be successful in hiding the animal, it might matter that
the patterns it involves stand in the right relationships to each other;
however, it might otherwise be irrelevant what size the individual
patterns are.
23 Figure 2 assumes that all combinations of leaf and fruit size that
are non-optimal have the same level of fitness; however, this can be
changed at the cost of further complications (essentially, one can
make the fitness landscape three-dimensional, and let fitness drop off
non-uniformly and continuously as one moves away from the line in
Fig. 2).
24 It does need to be noted, though, that the FIC cannot establish
which of the two traits is the adaptation and which is the ‘‘internal
environment,’’ or if both traits are adaptations to each other. In order
to establish this, another method is needed—for example, increases in
one trait must be brought about artificially in the lab, and the fitness of
organisms that differ in the second trait must be measured. However,
this issue can be tackled separately from the one at stake here, and
does not invalidate the present conclusion in any way. See also above
in note 11.
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regard, the methodological charge is a more worrisome
objection to the FIC than the conceptual charge (which can
be fully resolved). Still, though, it must also be noted that
the force behind the present response is quite considerable:
between them, the three selective scenarios laid out above
comprise a significant part of the landscape of selective
hypotheses that we might want to investigate.25 These
scenarios allow us to consider different forms of traditional
external selection, and they allow us to consider the
slightly less common, but no less interesting, case of
internal selection. Hence, the possibility to investigate the
above three selective scenarios should be seen to be suf-
ficient to vindicate at least the overall plausibility—and
certainly the widespread acceptance of the FIC.
Individuals, Populations, and Independent Contrasts
Before concluding, it is useful to briefly make more
explicit the contrast between the arguments presented in
the context of the defense of the conceptual charge of the
FIC—where the method was shown to be concerned with
investigating the modularity of two traits—and those pre-
sented in the context of the defense of methodological
charge of the FIC—where the method was shown, among
others, to be concerned with investigating two (or more)
traits that are internal adaptations to each other. The use-
fulness of doing this derives from the fact that, at least on
the face of it, these two scenarios seem very similar to each
other: both feature traits with a flat environmental fitness
function, and both see changes in one of these traits as
engendering changes in the other trait. This might make it
puzzling as to why one of these scenarios was discussed
under the heading of drift, and the other under the heading
of (internal) selection. However, beneath these superficial
similarities, there are some major differences between
these two scenarios that it is useful to point out here.
These differences primarily concern the location of the
source of the connection between the traits in question: in
the modularity-based case, this source is located on the
individual level—there, changes in one trait cause changes
in the other in a particular individual (e.g., because of the
presence of various biochemical or physical connections
between the traits). In the case of internal selection, the
source is located on the population level—there, those
organisms in the population whose expressions of the traits
(for whatever reason) are in the appropriate ratio to each
other do better than those for which this expression is in the
wrong ratio (see also Sober 1984). Put differently, in cases
of internal selection, no deep physical or biochemical
connections between the traits in individual organisms
need to be presumed to exist; by contrast, in cases of low
trait modularity, the existence of these connections is
precisely what is at issue.
This is an important point to note, as it goes beyond the
issues surrounding the FIC at stake here. In particular, the
present discussion shows that, in general, correlated evo-
lution can come about through very different causal routes
operating at very different levels: it could be due to prox-
imate connections in the traits in individual organisms, or it
could be due to adaptive links between these traits in a
population of organisms.26 Keeping this distinction in mind
is necessary to get a proper understanding of correlated
evolution, and has many further important implications—
for example, when it comes to various natural or experi-
mental interventions, or in respect to the study of the
mechanisms that bring about causal connections between
various traits in individuals organisms.27 Hence, the pres-
ent discussion holds lessons beyond those concerning the
FIC—it illustrates issues that arise in the study of corre-
lated evolution quite generally.
Conclusion
I have argued that it is possible to at least mitigate Sober’s
recent objection to the FIC. Specifically, I have tried to
show, first, that a related conceptual objection to the
method—the claim that it is conceptually incoherent to
suppose that there could be two selectively neutral traits
that are evolutionarily correlated—does not pose a major
threat to the cogency of the FIC. In this case, the target of
the method should simply be seen as the investigation of
the modularity of the relevant traits. Second, when it comes
to Sober’s methodological objection more specifically, viz.,
the claim that the method closes off the possibility that the
relevant traits have evolved by natural selection, its force
should not be overstated either. In this case, it can be
25 This is also important in the context of the point raised in note 13
above.
26 In fact, both of these could be true at the same time: for example, it
might be adaptive for two traits to stand in a certain ratio with respect
to each other, but certain instances of this ratio might also be
physiologically determined (e.g., if fruit become sufficiently large,
larger leaves might be a physical necessity; at any point, though, only
a certain ratio of fruit and leaf size is adaptive).
27 Note that what the FIC, specifically, can add to this study is to
provide (a) a quick check to see whether there are any linkages among
the relevant traits that it would be useful to investigate further, and
(b) partial evidence of the degree of modularity and evolutionary
history of the relevant traits (using further experimental data to supply
the relevant missing premises—see also notes 12 and 24). Neither of
these contributions should be underrated. Finally, note that this issue
is neutral concerning the debate whether natural selection can also
have effects in individual organisms; for more on this debate, see,
e.g., Neander 1995; Sober 1995; Bouchard and Rosenberg 2004;
Forber 2005; Millstein 2006.
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shown that, in fact, the FIC can investigate various selec-
tive hypotheses (either because the assumption of Brown-
ian motion it rests on is merely used as an idealizing
mathematical tool, or because it is in fact consistent with
certain selective scenarios). While this cannot fully resolve
Sober’s objection, it can at least go a significant part of the
way towards doing so.
Overall, I have thus tried to show that on the one hand,
there are no conceptual or methodological concerns that
speak against the FIC deservedly holding a central place in
the (evolutionary) biologist’s toolkit. On the other, I have
tried to show that correlated evolution can come about both
due to causes that work on the population level and those
that work on the individual level. For these reasons, the
issues discussed here hold an interest for anyone concerned
with deepening our understanding of the way biological
evolution works.
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